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Abstract: In 2013 Juels and Rivest introduced the Honeywords System, a password-based authentication system de-
signed to detect when a password file has been stolen. A Honeywords System stores passwords together with
indistinguishable decoy words so when an intruder steals the file, retrieves the words, and tries to log-in, he
does not know which one is the password. By guessing one from the decoy words, he may not be lucky and
reveal the leak. Juels and Rivest left a problem open: how to make the system secure even when the intruder
corrupted the login server’s code. In this paper we study and solve the problem. However, since “code cor-
ruption” is a powerful attack, we first define rigorously the threat and set a few assumptions under which the
problem is still solvable, before showing meaningful attacks against the original Honeywords System. Then
we elicit a fundamental security requirement, implementing which, we are able to restore the Honeywords
System’s security despite a corrupted login service. We verify the new protocol’s security formally, using
ProVerif for this task. We also implement the protocol and test its performance. Finally, at the light of our
findings, we discuss whether it is still worth using a fixed honeywords-based system against such a power-
ful threat, or whether it is better, in order to be resilient against code corruption attacks, to design afresh a
completely different password-based authentication solution.
1 INTRODUCTION
Password-based authentication is the most used
method to validate users (Furnell et al., 2000). For
users is very simple: they type username and pass-
word and submit the pair by pressing the return key
or a mouse’s button. For servers, it is easy as well:
they check the credentials against a database of le-
gitimate user-password pairs and grant access if the
search succeeds.
The authentication process is trustworthy only if
passwords remain secret. Users are expected to keep
them safe, they are supposedly transmitted over en-
crypted channels, and servers are expected not to store
them in cleartext but rather to keep them hashed (usu-
ally with some “salt”) in a file called the password
file.
Keeping passwords safe never works perfectly.
Users can (or can be lured to) reveal their credentials,
and servers can be hacked and have the password file
stolen, exposing the hashed passwords to offline dic-
tionary attacks. In both cases, intruders will gain, ille-
gitimately, an authorized access. Recent news reports
on the extent of the problem. In 2016, the NY Times
wrote: “Yahoo!, already reeling from its September
disclosure that 500 million user accounts had been
hacked in 2014, disclosed Wednesday that a differ-
ent attack in 2013 compromised more than 1 billion
accounts” (Goel and Perlroth, 2016). In the month
in which we wrote this paper, Oct. 2017, Yahoo ad-
mitted that indeed the number of accounts affected by
the data breach in 2013 is above 3 billion (Newman,
2017). As well in 2016, Mashable reported: “MyS-
pace and Tumblr have recently joined LinkedIn on the
list of websites that had millions of login credentials
stolen and put up for sale later. More than 64 million
Tumblr accounts and more than 360 million MySpace
accounts were affected by the data breaches.” (Beck,
2016). The theft was discovered in 2016 when some-
one tried to sell the credentials in the black market. In
these examples, what hits as dramatic as the number
of passwords lost is the large delay that has passed
between an attack and its detection. Failing to detect
a password breakage on time worsens the problem. It
delays the application of countermeasures to limit the
damage.
To improve the awareness of password(s) theft,
computer security research has proposed solutions.
For instance, Google monitors suspicious activities
and invites users to review from what device and from
which location they have accessed their account. But
of course, more critical is to ensure that a service be-
come aware of the theft of a password file because,
from it, a great deal of passwords is exposed at once.
This is what we discuss next.
2 RESEARCH CONTEXT
In 2013, Juels and Rivest proposed to mod-
ify the classical password-based authentication
scheme (Juels and Rivest, 2013). They called the new
system, the Honeywords System.
A Honeywords System hides and stores a user
(hashed) password in a list of decoy words, called
honeywords. Honeywords are to mimic the pass-
word, so that the password cannot be distinguished
from them. So, “redsun3” is a good honeyword for
“whitemoon5”. A sweetword should have the same
probability to be guessed e.g., by dictionary search
as the original password, enjoying a property called
flatness (Juels and Rivest, 2013; Erguler, 2016). Sev-
eral algorithms to generate (flat) honeyword’s are ex-
tensively discussed in (Juels and Rivest, 2013). The
relevant point is that, since it is very unlikely that
a user types a honeyword purely by chance, any at-
tempt to log in with a honeyword instead of the pass-
word indicates that the password file has been leaked.
In that case, the system flags the event and contin-
gency actions are taken (e.g., system administrators
are alerted, monitors are activated, user’s execution
rights are reduced, user’s actions are run in a sand-
box, and so on).
The Honeywords System’s architecture is logi-
cally organized in two modules: (1) a “computer sys-
tem” which, according to Juels and Rivest, is “any
system that allows a user to ‘log in’ after she has pro-
vided a username and a password” (ibid) and which
we call the Login Server (LS); (2) an auxiliary hard-
ened secure server that assists with the use of honey-
words, which Juels and Rivest call the Honeychecker
(HC).
For each registered user u, LS keeps (in the pass-
word file) the ordered list of u’s sweetwords (so are
called collectively honeywords and passwords), de-
noted here by [h(wx)]u, for x ∈ [1,k] where k is the
fixed number of sweetwords. In turn, HC stores cu,
the index of u’s password in the list.
At authentication, the system runs a simple proto-
col: LS receives (u,w); then, it searches the hashed
version of w, in the list of (hashed) sweetwords of u.
If no match is found, login is denied. Otherwise the
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Figure 1: Honeywords System Protocol
LS sends to the HC the message (u, j), where j is the
found position. This communication occurs over ded-
icated and/or encrypted and authenticated channels.
The HC checks whether j = cu. In case the test suc-
ceeds, access is granted. In case the test fails, it is up
to the HC to decide what to do. Juels and Rivest say:
“Depending on the policy chosen, the honeychecker
may or may not reply to the computer system when
a login is attempted. When it detects that something
is amiss with the login attempt, it could signal to the
computer system that login should be denied. On the
other hand it may merely signal a ‘silent alarm’ to
an administrator, and let the login on the computer
system proceed. In the latter case, we could perhaps
call the honeychecker a ‘login monitor’ rather than a
‘honeychecker’.”(ibid). Figure 1 illustrates the proto-
col considering a responsive honeychecker.
The Honeywords System does not impede that a
password file is stolen nor it avoids impersonation:
an intruder who has retrieved by an offline dictionary
attack the sweetwords can still succeed in guessing
the correct password of a user by random choice.
Contribution. Juels and Rivest have left open sev-
eral problems. One of them reads as follows (the ital-
ics is ours):
“How can a Honeywords System best be de-
signed to withstand active attacks e.g., ma-
licious messages issued by a compromised
computer system or code modification of the
computer system?’ (ibid).
Here we take on the task to discuss the part of
the problem regarding “to withstand code modifica-
tion of the computer system”, which we remind is the
module that we call the LS. The corruption of this
component poses indeed the interesting case: it is dis-
cussed in (Juels and Rivest, 2013) where the authors
state: “compromising only the honeychecker at worst
reduces security to the level it was before the intro-
duction of honeywords and the honeychecker”. In-
stead, the situation worsens if HC and LS were both
corrupted. In this case we are inclined to believe that
there is no way to detect the leakage of password file
whereas the intruder has a way to gain access unno-
ticed, but only a rigorous analysis, out of scope but
suitable for future work, can provide evidence to this
claim.
Thus, we study security of the Honeywords Sys-
tem against an adversary that has succeeded in “code
modifying the LS” and we propose a solution for
it. However, since the notion of “code modification”
was left informal in Juels and Rivest’s work and it is
not clear enough to understand the real nature of the
threat, we first need to critically discuss it.
In §3 we give a rigorous definition for the threat
“code modification”, which we rename “code corrup-
tion” to stress its maliciousness. We also state a few
foundational assumptions before thoroughly giving
the analysis of security of the original Honeywords
System under the threat.
In §4 we prove the Honeywords System insecure,
illustrating an attack that works when the LS’s code
has been corrupted according to our model and under
our assumptions. The attack reveals that when con-
fronted against the threat, the original Honeywords
System has a core weakness. From studying the root
cause of the attack we elicit a security requirement
and by fulfilling it we are able to provide a solution to
the problem.
In §5 we describe a new cryptographic protocol
which we argue that removes the weakness and so re-
stores security. We sustain this statement formally in
§7. We model in ProVerif the protocol together with
the code-corrupting adversary and we run an auto-
matic analysis. The results of the verification confirm
that the previous attack is no more possible. Actually,
we prove that there are no more attacks against the
new protocol, in the given model.
Our solution is meant to be primarily of theoret-
ical interest, but because its cryptographic primitives
rely on a generous use of exponentiation, we thought
useful to implement the protocol and benchmark its
performance with respect to the original Honeywords
System. The results of the tests are reported in §8:
they show that although slower than the original Hon-
eywords System, the loss in performance is linear in
k, the number of sweetwords. Roughly speaking, our
scheme can handle a few hundred authentication re-
quests per second on a laptop with the service running
on a virtual machine. It is reasonable to expect better
results on more performing servers.
At the end, in §9, we discuss our solution in
a wider perspective. We look at it from distance
to conclude that, although it solves the open prob-
lem and works against the code-corruption threat that
we have defined, it actually suggests a completely
innovative design for password-based authentication
stronger than that of the fixed Honeywords System.
3 ADVERSARY MODELS
What is a reasonable goal for an adversary that
intends to code corrupt the system? What is code cor-
ruption? What levels of corruption are interesting to
study?
We have to answer these questions to fully under-
stand the threat. And understanding code corruption
requires also introducing assumptions that limit the
extension of the threat. Code corruption can be very
disruptive and not all its instances are interesting, in
the sense that they do not bring to insights that help
up understanding fundamental weaknesses of the sys-
tem design. What understanding do we gain from a
code corruption that, for instance, causes a shut-down
of the entire systems? In short, we have to define rig-
orously our adversary model.
We start with an obvious assumption that follows
from the original Juels and Rivest’s paper:
Assumption 1. The adversary, before code-
corrupting the LS, knows the sweetwords but not the
passwords.
Assumption 1 says that the adversary has stolen
the password file and has reverse-engineered all the k
sweetwords of, say, user u: yet, he does not know
which one among u’s sweetwords is the password.
The adversary can try to guess it and log in with that
guess, which means that his probability to log in with-
out the HC’s raising an alarm is 1/k in the worst case,
when the intruder naı¨vely picks at random a sweet-
word. Additional factors, such as knowing social in-
formation about a specific user, might be used to in-
crease the probability of guessing the password. Let
us call this event a “successful log-in”.
Let us now start answering the first question:
“what is a reasonable goal for an adversary that in-
tends to code corrupt the system?”. We will consider
as the answer that a reasonable goal is to increase the
intruder’s probability of a successful log-in to a value
higher than that the intruder would have by guessing
the password and with an honest LS.
Definition 1. The goal of a code corruption attack is
to increase the adversary’s probability to successfully
log in with respect to the probability of guessing the
password among the sweetwords retrieved from the
passwords file.
We answer the second question “what is code cor-
ruption?” gradually. We start with a very general
and powerful definition, but we will later constrain
it while answering the last question “what levels of
corruption are reasonable to consider”?
Definition 2. Let ls.exe be the code that defines the
protocol executed by the LS. Code corruption of LS
means changing ls.exe.
With its code corrupted, the LS’s working can
change completely. An intruder can reprogram it to
do whatever, e.g., to play chess.1 However, we are
not interested in attacks that change the functional-
ity of the LS, for the reason that they do not help the
adversary to increase its probability of successful log-
ging in. For a similar reason, we are not interested in
attacks that shut-down the systems or cause Denial-
of-Service. These are important attacks from which
to seek defense, but out-of-scope in this study.
We also exclude attacks such as those consisting
in changing ls.exe to always grant access. Actually,
there is a technical reason for this choice. The original
paper does not give full detail of the architecture of
the “computer system”, our LS, but it seems reason-
able to assume that Honeywords System implements
a separation of duties (Botha and Eloff, 2001). And
the duty of LS is only to search the proffered pass-
word in the password file, to consult the HC, and pos-
sibly to report the decision to the user, but not to grant
or deny accesses.
So, what is a reasonable code corruption? We con-
sider here a particular type of corruption, as much
as possible “undetectable”, that is working without
raising suspect of LS’s misbehaving into the other
modules. This can be achieved by changing ls.exe
in such a way that LS’s behaviour remains the same
from the point of view of the modules it interacts with,
mainly from the viewpoint of who can raise alarms,
primarily the HC and, secondarily, the system admin-
istrators.
Assumption 2. A code corruption against LS does
not change the LS’s observable behaviour.
The rationale of this assumption is that, if the ad-
versary changes the observable behaviour of LS, this
would result in an anomaly that can be detected, trig-
gering an alert in response to which a safe version of
the ls.exe can be restored. Since the adversary may
have a once-in-lifetime opportunity to corrupt LS’s
1This is what R. Gonggrijp did when, in 2006, proved
insecure a Dutch electronic voting machine.
code, he may not want to see his efforts vanishing in
this way. Of course not all attackers will be so con-
cerned about being undetected. They can be satisfied
by managing to log in and say ex-filtrate sensitive data
might be fine, even if this leaves a trail. But we de-
cided to scope our analysis only within the context of
Assumption 2.
However, even under Assumption 2 there are sub-
tleties that need to be addressed. Interpreted strictly it
does not allow the creation of any back door between
the adversary and the LS that this last can use at any-
time to leak information. This is because, interpret-
ing strictly the term “undetectability”, an exchange of
messages from the LS towards the adversary and out-
side the protocol’s message flow can be eventually de-
tected (e.g., by monitoring the net traffic), leading to
have a safe version of the ls.exe re-installed. Thus
according to this interpretation, Assumption 2 says
that if the intruder wants to communicate with the cor-
rupted LS, it must use the same channels from which
legitimate users log in, and must respect the message
flow of the honest protocol. This does not exclude
that, when re-coding ls.exe, the adversary can use
the knowledge he has gained from having hacked the
password file in the first place. It can use the user’s
IDs and sweetwords, and it can hard-code this infor-
mation in the corrupted ls.exe.
Still, if we take Assumption 2 less strictly, it ad-
mits that some information can flow back to the ad-
versary, for example, in message resp. And, as we
will discuss in detail in §4, letting LS to communicate
back to the adversary leads to a powerful attack that
breaks the original Honeywords System. In short, the
attack works because LS can learn u’s password (or
the hash of it). This is a feature more than a vulner-
ability but a feature that a collusive adversary able to
invert the hash can exploit to know the password. So,
an incentive for code corrupting the LS is exactly to
create this retroactive communication and we cannot
exclude this possibility in our analysis. We propose
thus the following methodology. By default we inter-
pret Assumption 2 strictly but, separately, we always
discuss what happens if we relax this constraint and
let LS leak information to the intruder.
Notably, the new protocol that we describe in §5,
although designed to secure the Honeywords System
under an Assumption 2 interpreted strictly turns out to
be efficient also when we relax it. The new protocol
will not impede the leak nor stop the adversary from
learning u’s password, but will make that information
useless for the adversary because it will not be able
log in with it into the system. Somehow our solution
reduces considerably the role of the password as the
only authentication token.
4 ATTACKS
As future reference, we write down how ls.exe
looks like. Algorithm 1 shows it in pseudo-code, us-
ing a notation whose commands are self-explanatory.
Here, passwd is the password file, passwdu is the
row of user u, and H is a hash function (e.g., SHA-3
(NIST, 2015)). We also assume that u is a legitimate
user’s name.
Algorithm 1 Login Server Authentication
1: procedure ls.exe(passwd)
2: while true do;
3: ReceiveFrom(U;(u,w));
4: j← IndexOf(H(w),passwdu);
5: SendTo(HC;(u, j));
6: ReceiveFrom(HC;resp);
7: SendTo(U;resp);
Algorithm 2 Code Corrupted LS
1: procedure ls′.exe(passwd)
2: (u′,w′)← (⊥,⊥) . init good (u,w)
3: while true do;
4: ReceiveFrom(U;(u,w));
5: if (u′ 6=⊥)∧ (u = Mallory) then
6: (u,w)← (u′,w′)
7: j← IndexOf(H(w),passwdu);
8: SendTo(HC;(u, j));
9: ReceiveFrom(HC;resp);
10: if (resp = granted) then
11: (u′,w′)← (u,w) . good (u,w)
12: SendTo(U;resp);
If the adversary can corrupt ls.exe, even under our
Assumption 2 taken strictly, there is an obvious at-
tack. The corrupted ls′.exe is reported in Algorithm 2.
It stores a good user’s password when LS sees it, and
then it reuses that knowledge to let the adversary gain
access, when the adversary reveals itself at the log-in
with a specific user name (e.g., “Mallory”).
Actually, LS could remember only the valid j
(in step 11) and, in a next round, skip searching the
passwdu (step 7), and send that j to the HC (step 8).
But the corrupted ls.exe outlined above mimics the
behaviour of LS more faithfully and shows also that
LS gets knowledge of a user’s valid password. This,
we will see, is the root of serious vulnerability.
Algorithm 2 represents an ideal attack. Not al-
ways, in instruction 10, the LS learns u’s password
with certainty. This may happen, for instance, when
the HC follows a contingency policy that dictate to re-
spond by granting access even when he sees a sweet-
word, as suggested in the original work (see also our
quote of it in §2). However, the following strategy
gives the LS at least a good chance to guess the pass-
word, especially when the strategy is coordinated with
the adversary: since the adversary is the only one that
can submit honeywords, it refrains itself from trying
to access for a certain time. During this interval, the
only requests that arrive to the LS pretending to be
from user u are actually from the legitimate u; all the
w that come with the requests then must be the u’s
legitimate password. Surely, the user can sometimes
misspell the password, but that will never collide with
a honeyword (because honeywords are flat, see §2).
It is therefore possible for the LS, purely by statisti-
cal analysis and by cross comparison between what
u submits, to infer the u’s real password and at that
moment the LS can so help the adversary as we illus-
trated in our ideal version of the attack. The adversary
has raised its probability to gain a successful access to
values higher than 1/k.
This attack is already serious but under a relaxed
Assumption 2, LS can further send the password back
to the adversary, who now can use the u’s credentials
at any time.
Discussion. The root cause of the attack seems
therefore to lie in the fact that LS knows u’s password.
Only hashing the password will not help, since the LS
can search the position in the password file or, under
a relaxed Assumption 2, send the hash back to the ad-
versary who can reserve the hash. The main problems
seem then rooted into three concomitant facts: (a) LS
receives username and password in clear; (b) LS can
query HC as an oracle to know whether that submitted
password is the user u’s valid password (in this way it
also get to know the hash of the password); (c) LS can
retrieve the index of the password in passwdu. So, if
a solution exists that makes the system secure despite
a corrupted ls.exe then it would be such that it avoids
that LS could perform all these three actions (a)-(c)
together. We state this finding as a requirement:
Requirement 1. A solution for a LS resilient to code
corruption should not (1) let the LS receive usernames
and (tentative) passwords in clear, (2) let it know
when the typed input refers to a valid password, and
(3) allow it to reuse that pair to retrieve a valid index
at any moment that is not when a legitimate user logs
in.
5 TOWARDS A SOLUTION
In searching for a solution we are not interested in
pragmatic fixes like checking regularly the integrity
of ls.exe and reinstalling a safe copy. Our lack of
interest is not because solutions like that are not fully
effective (e.g., the intruder can still execute its attack
before any integrity check is performed) but because
such pragmatic fixes do not give any insights about
the real weakness of the system. The same argument
holds for best practices like forcing users changing the
password frequently. Thus, if a solution exists then it
must be searched in a strategy that satisfies our re-
quirement’s items (1)-(3).
One way to comply with them is by implementing
the following countermeasures: (i) passwdu is shuf-
fled each time LS queries HC: this avoids that LS can
reuse an index j that it has learned to be the index of
u’s password; (ii) passwdu is re-hashed each time LS
queries HC: this avoids that LS can search again for
the index of a typed password that it got to know be-
ing a valid u’s password; (iii) let the LS know what
to search in passwdu only when user u is logging in:
this precaution is to avoid that LS can perform off-line
searches on passwdu.
The countermeasures (i)-(ii), and so requirements
(1)-(2), can be implemented leaving HC in charge of
shuffling and re-hashing the password file each time
that a user logs in and that the LS questions the HC
about index j.
The shuffling does not require particular explana-
tion. It must be randomized but is a standard step:
given a row [w1, . . . ,wk], and a permutation pi, it re-
turns [wpi(1), . . . ,wpi(k)].
The re-hashing, instead, needs to be explained. It
is implemented by cryptographic exponentiation. For
each user, HC possesses g, a generator of a multi-
plicative subgroupG of order q (so, actually, g should
be written gu, but to lighten the notation we omit the
index u). When first the list of sweetwords is gen-
erated, the file is initially hashed using gr0 , where
r0 ∈ {1, · · · ,q−1} is a random number. The u’s row
of the file is therefore [gr0·w1 , . . . ,gr0·wk ], which we
write [hr0(w1), . . . ,hr0(wk)] to stress that this is a hash-
ing. More synthetically we also write it as hr0(w).
To rehash the row and obtain hr1(w), HC choses a
new random number r1 ∈ {1, · · · ,q−1} and, for each
element wi of the row, it calculates
hr0(wi)
r1
r0 = (gr0·wi)
r1
r0 = gr0·
r1
r0
·wi = gr1·wi .
The process can be iterated: to re-hash token hrn(w),
HC selects another number rn+1 ∈ {1, · · · ,q−1} and
computes (hrn(w))rn+1/rn which is the re-hashed token
hrn+1(w).
HC
hrn(wpi(1))
...
hrn(wpi(k))
c
hrn+1(wpi′(1))
...
hrn+1(wpi′(k))
pi′(c)
Figure 2: Shuffling/re-hashing w’s and updating c.
In fact, HC reshuffles and re-hashes passwdu in
one single step as shown in Figure 2.
So far, we are envisioning a message flow as fol-
lows: when HC receives from LS a check query, it
also receives passwdrnu , which it shuffles using a new
ordering pi′, and re-hashes using a freshly generated
rn+1. The re-hashed, re-shuffled row of u, passwdu, is
therefore [hrn(wu,pi′(i))]i∈{1,...,k}, which we write com-
pactly as passwdrn+1u . HC performs these three steps
indivisibly: the passwdrnu should not be accessed by
concurrent versions of the HC before it has been shuf-
fled and re-hashed.
What explained so far implements countermea-
sures (i) and (ii). However, each nth time that a user
u logs in and submits the password w, LS needs first
to calculate hrn(w) = grn·w before being able to search
for w’s index in passwdrnu .
Letting LS to do this while avoiding that it gets
to know u’s password (i.e., by taking advantage of
knowing the re-hashed password file passwdrnu and
the re-hashed hrn(w), so anticipating the search and
using HC as an oracle) is not obvious. We need to
implement countermeasure (iii) and prevent LS from
searching the file at any time that is not when a legit-
imate user u logs in.
Our final solution is explained in §6 and its work-
flow is illustrated in Figure 3. Its core idea is to inform
the HC when a user is logging in, but without passing
through the LS which may otherwise interfere with
the communication. Because of the risk of man-in-
the-middle attacks, this communication should not be
over the Internet either. Instead, it must happen on a
secure second channel between the user and the HC,
which we suggest to be the ether and implement by
letting them use a One-Time-Password (OTP) device.
We are aware that, introduced without an adequate ex-
planation, the need of a second channel and our sug-
gestion to use an OTP may appear arbitrary and un-
justified. They are not. Thus, in the next section we
briefly explain our reasons, but the reader interested
only in the new protocol can skip it, and restart the
reading from §6.
Why a Second Channel? Before concluding that
we need a second channel between the user and the
HC we tried to comply with countermeasure (iii) by
other ways. One attempt was to add a module, called
Keys Register (KR), to keep rn. Abstractly, this sug-
gests to outsource the calculation of the hash of the
submitted password out from the LS. In particular,
we let KR receive (u,w) and calculate the hrn(w). The
token is thus forwarded to the LS, who also receives
the username u. Notably, KR’s role cannot be played
by LS itself. This would lead it to know the hash
of the password and so its valid index, consequently
enabling an attack as we have described previously.
KR’s role apart, the authentication process is not dif-
ferent from what we described before, with the HC
that also shuffles, re-hashes, and returns the password
file to the LS, but at the end the HC sends the new
rn+1 only to the KR, which is ready for a new session.
This solution works i.e., it is secure, but only if KR
cannot be code-corrupted. This is not an assumption
that we intend to take easily. According to Juels and
Rivest, the only component that is hardened secure is
the HC. Thus, KR should be considered corruptible.
And if it is so, the intermediate solution has a flaw. An
adversary can compromise both kr.exe and ls.exe and,
even under a strict Assumption2 with no back doors,
manage to successfully log in. The attack is imple-
mented by the following corrupted code, where we
assume h′ and passwd′u be updates of h and passwdu.
The corrupted instructions are in red:
Algorithm 3 Code Corrupted KR
1: procedure kr′.exe(rn)
2: while true do;
3: ReceiveFrom(U;(u,w);
4: SendTo(LS;hrn(w));
5: ReceiveFrom(HC;rn+1);
6: SendTo(LS;hrn+1(w));
KR resends the last w, re-hashed using the new
rn+1 received from HC. KR does not know whether
w is a valid password, but a corrupted LS does. The
attack works because LS gets pieces of information
beforehand, using which, he can anticipate querying
the new password file and get a valid j that can be
used to let the adversary in.
Alternative ways to implement (iii), such as using
timestamps from the user’s side as a proof of fresh-
ness do not work either since LS stands in the mid-
dle and can compromise those messages. For all this
follows our conclusion that if there must be a “syn-
chronization” between users and the HC, it must be
happening over a channel that is not under the control
on any module of the Honeywords System nor of the
adversary.
6 THE NEW PROTOCOL
One way to realize requirement’s items (i)-(iii) in
agreement with the Honeywords System solution, is
to empower the user (i.e., the user’s browser) with the
ability to hash his password w with grn using the same
rn that is generated by the HC. It is (almost) equiva-
lent to let the user play the role of KR.
However, letting HC send r directly to the user
over the Internet leaves the channel exposed to man-
in-the-middle attacks and introduces other issues such
as that of ensuring authentication of the user. The
channel through which the HC “communicates” with
the user must be a second channel and not in the In-
ternet. We already justified this choice in the previous
section.
The solution that we are about to discuss now and
prove secure in the next section requires that the HC
and the user share an OTP device. This is employed to
generate a new seed r each time that the OTP is used,
a seed which is also the same for the user and the HC.
The protocol message sequence diagram is detailed in
Figure 3.
The OTP serves as pseudo-random generator but
also as proof of freshness, since what it generates is
synchronized with what the OTP generates by the HC.
Here we talk of an OTP that generates a new seed each
time that it is pressed.
In Figure 3, we have indicated with OTP(n) the
action of using the OTP for the nth time (step 1). The
user sends to the LS, the username u and the hashed
version of its password, hrn(w), where the hashing
takes the nth OTP-generated number rn as parameter
(step 2).
Then, the protocol follows as expected: the LS
searches for an index in the password file (step 3); the
file has been reshuffled and re-hashed in a previous
session by the HC, which has used in anticipation the
same OTP number that the user has now used to hash
the password (we will discuss in §6 how to handle
when a user “burns” a generated number by pressing
the OTP accidentally outside the login). The found
index j is submitted together with the username and
the row of the password file that LS has just used in
the search (step 4).
The HC checks first j against cu (i.e., the index
of the user’s password) to determine whether to grant
access or not (step 5), then shuffles and re-hashes the
password file’s row. It also updates the cu considering
the index’s re-ordering (steps 6). The shuffled and
re-hashed file is returned to the LS (step 7) and LS
notifies the user (step 8).
Informal Security Analysis. We argue that there is
no corruption of the LS that under our assumptions
can lead to a successful attack. In particular, even if
the LS learns that a particular hrn(w) is a valid pass-
word, LS cannot make any use of it to anticipate the
index that w will have in the new reshuffled and re-
hashed password file. LS could retain an old file, but
the index retrieved from it is not the new c′u that the
HC now holds. It could send to the HC the user-
name and sweetwords file’s row of another user and
so have this later reshuffled and re-hashed. The only
gain is that LS will likely have the request rejected
without never get to know whether that hashed honey-
word (and consequently the j calculated) were good
for access. Note that even if two users use the same
password, it is very unlikely that the hashes are the
same if we assume that each user has its own OTP.
LS can send the username u and password file’s row
of another user to know the answer about the correct-
ness of j without having the file’s row of u reshuffled
and re-hashed. But then, HC changes cu and so the
LS will not be able to take advantage of what he has
learned; besides, the effect seems to be disastrous in
terms of compromising the integrity of a future check,
when u logs in again. This counts as a Denial-of-
Service (DoS) but not as an attack according to Def-
inition 1 since it does not increase the probability of
the adversary to gain access, which remains 1/k.
Finally, our protocol is secure even under a re-
laxed Assumption 2. Even if the LS, learned that a
particular hrn(w) is a valid password, sends it back to
the adversary which in turn retrieves the w, the adver-
sary cannot use either w or the token hrn(w) to gain
access. He needs the token hrn+1(w) which he cannot
generate without holding also the OTP.
Before concluding, we comment on what to do if
the user accidentally burns some of the valid OTPs.
A classic solution is that the HC anticipates new ver-
sions of the password file using a certain number, say
m, of the next OTPs. The file’s row for user u becomes
a matrix where each row is ordered with the same pi′: h
rn(wu,pi′(1)), · · · , hrn(wu,pi′(k))
...
hrn+m(wu,pi′(1)), · · · , hrn+m(wu,pi′(k))

The HC stores one cu as before, but when shuffling
and re-hashing the matrix for the new run, it discards
all the rows that correspond to the OTP numbers that
the user has accidentally burned, including the one
used in the current submission (which HC receives
from LS).
7 FORMAL ANALYSIS
We modeled the original protocol and our pro-
posal (Fig. 3) in the applied-pi calculus and used
ProVerif (Blanchet, 2001) to formally verify their se-
curity. ProVerif is an automatic verifier for cryp-
tographic protocols under the Dolev-Yao model.
The code for and results of the analysis are avail-
able at https://github.com/codeCorruption/
HoneywordsM.
Analysis of the Original System. We start by an-
alyzing the original Honeywords System. We know
already that there is an attack, but our aim is to test
the proper way to model a LS that has been code
corrupted according to Assumption 2. Moreover, we
need to correctly interpret the results, discarding at-
tacks originated from stronger attackers than the one
defined in our threat model.
Our design is based in the following decisions.
There are three parties: the User (U), the LS and
the HC. The LS is an active attacker since it is able
to read and send messages from and to the HC; the
channel between LS and HC is thus public. In con-
trast, the channel between U and LS is private, other-
wise the attacker can learn a correct pair of user and
password from the beginning, contradicting Assump-
tion 1. Note that this decision together with the fact
that the password is never transmitted in the public
channel, prevents the attacker to know the submitted
password at any time. It also rules out the simplest
guessing (password) attack, which is the first one that
ProVerif finds in the analysis, allowing the verifier to
find attacks more related to the protocol’s flow. We
know already that a guessing attack is always pos-
sible, since Honeywords System is not designed to
avoid it.
The attack described in §4 violates the security
property:
correctIndex(u, j) =⇒ injct(indexFound(u, p, j))
&& injct(usrLogged(u, p))
It expresses that, whenever the HC sends a posi-
tive answer to the LS for a submitted pair of user and
index (u, j), all of these three actions occurred: (1) a
user logged in with a pair of credentials (u, p) (2) the
index j found by the LS corresponds to (u, p) and (3)
the value stored in HC for u is equal to j. Injectivity
in the expression (injct) captures the fact of HC pro-
cessing only once each request that LS submits after
events (1) and (2), to prevent interaction between LS
and HC in the absence of a user.
u,w,OTP(·)
U
[hrn(wpi(i))]i
LS
cu,OTP(·)
HC
1 : rn← OTP(n)
2: u,hrn(w)
3 : j← IndexOf(hrn(w), [hrn(wu,pi(i))]i)
4:
(
u, [hrn(wu,pi(i))]i, j
)
5 : resp← ( j = cu)
6 :
rn← OTP(n)
rn+1← OTP(n+1)
r′← rn+1/rn
[hrn+1(wu,pi′(i))]i← Shuffle&Encrypt([hrn(wu,pi(i))]i,r′)
c′u← pi′(cu)
If ( j = cu)
7: resp, [hrn+1(wu,pi′(i))]i
If ( j 6=⊥)6
8: resp
Figure 3: The new protocol
Result. As expected, the verification indicates that
the property does not hold. The attack found shows
how once the attacker (in this case the LS) gets a posi-
tive answer from the HC, it is able to send a new check
request to HC with the correct user and index, gaining
access to the system and thus contradicting injectivity,
because there was not a new usrLogged(u, p) event
for that second request. These observations support
our model design for code-corruption and provide for-
mal evidence that a Honeywords System resilient to
the flaw must satisfy Requirement 1.
Analysis of our Solution. We are now ready to ap-
ply the analysis to the new protocol. In this ProVerif
model, all channels are public since the LS can send
requests at any time and can learn the inputs from U
and HC. We choose this design to discover any at-
tack using any information available. Conversely, the
LS’s function that retrieves the index of a sweetword
is private, because LS can get information from the
password’s file but cannot modify it.
Unlike in the original, in this protocol each in-
stance of U is synchronized with a HC instance by
a seed, representing that both parts generate the same
OTP at the beginning of a round; the HC knows as
well the index of the password. Then, to give LS
the opportunity to attempt an attack using the knowl-
edge gained during the run of the protocol, we model
the fact that HC keeps running with the updated in-
dex after reshuffling. The LS is almost as in the
original protocol, except that this time it receives a
hashed password parametrized by the OTP, instead of
a plain password. An index is a term determined by
the hashed word searched and the row of sweetwords
where it is searched. Our expanded representation in
ProVerif is
indexOfHw(hashWord(w,getOTP(n)),
shuffleNhash(u,n))
where hashWord is the hash of the plain submitted
word w calculated with the seed n; shuffleNhash is
the sweetwords’ row for user u hashed with seed n.
Our equational theory relies on the checkEqual
function in the HC, which returns true only when all
the parameters in the indexes under comparison are
equal. After a successful match, the index hold by
the HC is affected by the next seed value, becoming
indexOfHw(...getOTP(next(n)), ...(u,next(n))).
Therefore, after this point the evaluation of
checkEqual will be false for any submitted in-
dex not obtained with the new seed.
The property that we want to prove is the same as
for the original Honeywords System:
correctIndex(u, j) =⇒ injct(usrLogged(u, p)) &&
injct(indexFound( j,
hashWord(p,x),
shuffleNhash(u,y)))
It states that every time an index j is equal to the one
in the HC’s database for u, then (a) the owner u of j
logged in with password p and (b) j corresponds to
the index of the hashed value of p in the sweetwords
row for u. The conjunction ensures the execution of
every step in the protocol; the injectivity ensures that
each is executed only once.
In addition, we introduce the property
event(unreachable) to verify that LS cannot re-
trieve a sweetword’s index of a word not submitted
by a user; the event unreachable is triggered if the
HC’s check function returns true after shuffling and
rehashing, when applied to a previously submitted
hashed password.
The model also assumes, as we stated in §5, that
HC must process LS’s requests atomically, finishing a
request before starting the next. Failing to implement
HC this way, leads to an attack as we are going to
explain in the next section, which prove that atomicity
is in fact necessary.
Result. All properties were verified to be true al-
most immediately. It follows that even knowing that a
certain hashWord(p,getOTP(n)) is a valid password,
LS cannot use it to anticipate the new good index,
since it depends on the seed value possessed only by
U and HC.
The analysis also proves that event unreachable is
actually unreachable and this implies that LS cannot
get any advantage even if using HC as an oracle if
using messages obtained from previous runs with U
and HC.
We also verified that it is necessary for the HC to
process parallel requests coming from the same user
u without breaking the indivisibility of the update of
passwdu. Removing this constrain reveals an attack.
The attack is as follows: let HC1 and HC2 be parallel
runs of the HC, then (1) After a LS request, HC1 ver-
ifies that the submitted index is correct and sends the
answer to LS (2) LS submits again the correct index,
HC2 processes it, finishes the protocol and grants ac-
cess (3) HC1 continues its execution and grants access
as well.
8 COMPLEXITY AND
PERFORMANCE
The contribution of this research is mainly theo-
retical but we judged useful to test the performance
of what we propose. We sketch a complexity analysis
and we benchmark an implementation of our protocol
both, with respect to the original system and by using
different parameter for the elliptic curve (EC) multi-
plication which we used to execute the main operation
of our protocol: exponentiation.
Complexity analysis. The analysis assumes that an
elliptic curve multiplication takes constant time tCURVE
(which depends on the employed CURVE): this pro-
tects implementations against remote timing attacks
(Brumley and Tuveri, 2011).
Let us now consider the operations that affect the
performance. Once received the password, LS calls
IndexOf to search the index of the submitted pass-
word among the sweetwords. Given that the sweet-
words are not ordered and also are constantly reshuf-
fled, this is a linear search. In the worst case it can be
done in O(k) time, where k is the number of sweet-
words per user. In case of a match, the HC checks
the validity of the index in O(1) time. Next, the HC
calls Shuffle&Hash; this function shuffles the sweet-
words in O(k) time and performs k times an EC mul-
tiplication in k · tCURVE time. The last equation is lin-
ear in k for a fixed CURVE. Since each of the previ-
ous operations takes at most O(k) time, the time com-
plexity of the new protocol is O(k). As well, for a
fixed k, the execution time increases linearly as tCURVE
grows. Moreover, EC multiplication is CPU intensive
and dominates the total execution time. This is also
confirmed by our empirical results (see Fig. 4(a)).
Communication Cost. In the original Honeywords
system, the communication cost per login comes from
messages (u, j) and resp. We denote the number of
bytes required to encode (u, j) and resp by |(u, j)| and
|resp| accordingly, and obtain the data transfer rate per
login as
C = |(u, j)|+ |resp|
While the data flow remains the same, our protocol
brings the following communication overhead to the
original Honeywords system: LS sends the sweet-
word hashes [hrn+1(wu,pi′(i))]ki=1 and receives the up-
dated ones. The number of bytes required to encode a
password hash depends on the employed curve and is
denoted by HCURVE. Thus, LS sends |(u, j)|+ kHCURVE
bytes and receives |resp|+kHCURVE bytes per login. As
a result, the total data transfer rate per login between
LS and HC is computed as C+2kHCURVE bytes.
Since k, the number of sweetwords, is a constant
defined by the system, and HCURVE is constant too, the
overload in communication is bounded. We have not
simulated nor evaluated how much this may affect a
server’s ability to process a great number of log-in at-
tempts per unit of time, but we are inclined to believe
that this loss in performance is not so dramatic. Of
course one may will to discuss whether the solution
that emerges from our analysis by fitting our require-
ments is not actually an overkill in itself. This is a
legitimate question which we discuss in § 9.
Implementation. We implemented our solution in
C# atop the Microsoft .NET framework.2 Elliptic
curve operations are performed using Bouncy Castle
Cryptographic Library, although a faster version may
be obtained by native language implementations or li-
braries.
In our implementation, u, j and resp are imple-
mented as integers, hence C equals 12 bytes and
HCURVE takes 57, 65, 97, and 133 bytes for P-224,
P-256, P-384 and P-521 accordingly. Fig. 4(c) com-
pares data transfer rates with different settings.
Performance Analysis. We measured the effi-
ciency of our proposed protocol with two questions in
mind: How does number of verifications per second
correlates with the number of honeywords? What is
the impact of the selected curve on verification speed?
The results presented have been performed on note-
books with Intel Core i7 CPU and 8GB of RAM over
an idle network. We measured the total execution
time on server side computations and communication
over the network separately. Roughly speaking, our
prototype reaches a decision for each login request
below 9 ms. Table 1 summarizes the overall perfor-
mance with different settings.
Another performance consideration is the cost of
avoiding login failures due to out-of-synchronization
of OTPs. System policies may follow the strategy dis-
cussed in Section 6. The computational overhead of
both, Login Server and Honeychecker, increases lin-
early on the number of copies in the password file.
It is reasonable to expect that the time required for
re-encryption directly depend on the number of hon-
eywords for a user. Fig. 4 illustrates the time measure-
ments. It can be seen that the time required for veri-
fying a single user increases linearly with the number
of honeywords per user. The Honeychecker performs
one EC multiplication for each honeyword, which is
the most expensive part of its function, and the result
2Source code is available under GPLv3 at https://
github.com/codeCorruption/HoneywordsM.
Table 1: Performance results of our implementation. Lo-
gin Server and Honeychecker columns display the time in
milliseconds for a single authentication on LS and HC, re-
spectively. Throughput column shows the maximum num-
ber of verifications per second. Round-Trip Time (RTT) is
the network delay during the experiments.
k Curve Login Server(ms)
Honeychecker
(ms)
Throughput
(login/s)
RTT
(ms)
5 P-224 0.011 1.709 581 24.446
5 P-256 0.009 1.796 554 28.917
5 P-384 0.009 2.242 444 31.502
5 P-521 0.010 2.541 392 30.812
10 P-224 0.009 2.680 372 24.534
10 P-256 0.009 3.317 301 29.885
10 P-384 0.010 4.365 229 34.918
10 P-521 0.010 4.793 208 29.414
15 P-224 0.009 3.856 259 27.063
15 P-256 0.010 4.868 205 30.896
15 P-384 0.009 6.240 160 36.253
15 P-521 0.010 6.842 146 31.445
20 P-224 0.009 5.016 199 26.867
20 P-256 0.010 6.301 158 29.355
20 P-384 0.010 8.220 122 32.724
20 P-521 0.011 8.965 111 31.944
is aligned with our theoretical expectations. Our so-
lution preserves the computational characteristics of
the original honeywords protocol: performance is lin-
early dependent on the number of honeywords. On
the other hand, we can see from Fig. 4 (and from Ta-
ble 1) that the time to run the employed curves in-
creases with the number of honeywords.
Figure 4(b) compares our protocol with the ref-
erence implementation. The client side latency of
both, original and improved protocols stays almost
constant. Considering the delays caused by the net-
work, the computational overhead of our protocol is
relatively small. It might not be even noticed by the
clients.
9 DISCUSSION
This paper takes inspiration from a challenge left
open in (Juels and Rivest, 2013). There, Juels and
Rivest propose a password-based authentication sys-
tem, called Honeywords System, meant to detect
when a password file has been stolen. User passwords
are hidden among a list of honeywords and an attacker
that knows all of them cannot do better than guessing
which one is the rightful password. This reduces its
probability of success while revealing the leak when
the attacker types one of the supposed secret honey-
words instead. The open problem is how to make this
concept work even when a key component of the Hon-
eywords System, the Login Server (LS), has its code
corrupted by an adversary.
We defined rigorously the notion of code-
corruption, which is too powerful if taken literally.
Constrained to become tractable, the adversary model
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Figure 4: (a) CPU time required to verify a user depending on the number of honeywords and employed curve. (b) Client
side latency comparison between original protocol and our proposal with NIST Curve P-256. (c) The amount of the data (in
kilobytes) transferred between the Login Server and the Honeychecker.
results to be a less powerful version than a Dolev-Yao,
but such that gives the attacker a better probability
of success than guessing the password from the set
of honeywords. The root cause of such attacks lays
in the LS knowing eventually a user’s valid (hashed)
password. The solution that we propose avoids that,
but at a price that seems unavoidable. It prevents
the LS to make, off-session, any good use of what
he knows, but the new protocol, according to the re-
quirements that we elicited from studying attacks on
the original Honeywords System, consists in shuffling
and rehashing the password (plus honeywords) after
any user’s attempt to log in. The new solution also
avoids that the LS can receive a token with which it
can search in the password file at any moment distinct
from when a legitimate user is logging in, but this
last requirement implies that the user and the Hon-
eychecker (HC) somehow get synchronized by us-
ing a second channel that is not controlled by the LS
or by a man-in-the-middle. We propose One-Time-
Passwords (OTPs) for this purpose. The solution is
secure as we proved formally in ProVerif.
Although our result has meaning mainly for its
theoretical insights, it performs reasonably well as we
show in a benchmark analysis we did on a prototype
that we have implemented in C#.
Our protocol works in the original Juels and
Rivest’s intention to let an attacker steal a password
file, run an off-line dictionary attack on it, and have
some chance to get into the system by guessing the
rightful password. However, our solution seems mak-
ing this attack useless. The intruder does not gain
anything from knowing a user’s password because
however he does not possess the OTP with which to
create the authentication token (i.e., the hash of the
password). This is the credential that let the system
grant access. At the light of this last observation we
further comment that even if the adversary commu-
nicates with the LS and gets to know the user pass-
word, (as we explained in §3), the adversary cannot
manage to log in. Our fix, at least for the new Hon-
eywords System, nullifies the adversary’s possibility
to exploit the password usefully to log in, although of
course leaking a password is still a serious weakness
because users may reuse the same password across
different sites. Still the strategy that we proposed
for our new protocol suggests a completely new di-
rection for password authentication, a procedure that
is resilient even if a password is lost. Thus, at this
point, one may want to go one step ahead and rethink
a new system afresh where an intruder could not take
any advantage after knowing the right password. This
is an interesting question that goes beyond what we
think was the proposal of Juels and Rivest, since it
would render a Honeywords System approach com-
pletely superfluous. Instead, it suggests a wholly re-
viewed password-based authentication process where
users still type their passwords but where the token
that the LS checks in the password file is one-time-
valid. If a solution exists, still it differs from cur-
rent OTP-based solutions that are used today e.g., in
home-banking, because of the assumption that it must
work even when the LS has been code-corrupted.
This is for us an interesting future work and an open
problem in password-base authentication.
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